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ABSTRACT 
We show how different approaches to developing marketing strategies depending on the type of 
environment a firm faces, where environments are distinguished in terms of their systems properties 
not their context.  Particular emphasis is given to turbulent environments in which outcomes are not 
a priori predictable and are not traceable to individual firm actions and we show that, in these 
conditions, the relevant unit of competitive response and understanding is no longer the individual 
firm but the network of relations comprising interdependent, interacting firms.  Networks of 
relations are complex adaptive systems that are more ‘intelligent’ than the individual firms that 
comprise them and are capable of comprehending and responding to more complex and turbulent 
environments. Yet they are co-produced by the patterns of actions and interactions of the firms 
involved.   The creation and accessing of such distributed intelligence cannot be centrally directed, 
as this necessarily limits it. Instead managers and firms are involved in a kind of participatory 
planning and adaptation process through which the network self-organises and adapts. Drawing on 
research in systems theory, complexity, biology and cognitive science, extensions to the resource-
based theory of the firm are proposed that include how resources are linked across relations and 
network in a dynamic and evolutionary way.  The concept of an extended firm and soft assembled 
strategies are introduced to describe the nature of the strategy development process. This results in a 
more theoretically grounded basis for understanding the nature and role of relationship and network 
strategies in marketing and management.  We finish by considering the research implications of our 
analysis and the role of agent based models as a means of sensitising and informing management 
action. 
Keywords:  Normative marketing theory; strategy, systems theory, relationship marketing, 
networks, turbulence, environment, adaptation, resource advantage theory 
Introduction 
Normative marketing theory involves prescriptions for firm’s strategies and planning – implying 
what firms should do.  There is no normative theory of chemistry physics or biology because 
chemicals, atoms, plants and animals do not use theories of chemistry, physics and biology to 
decide what they should do.  But in business this is not so; managers want to understand how and 
why business and markets work as they do and need theories about how they can develop better 
marketing strategies and become more effective competitors.  In this article we show how the nature 
of the strategic problems confronting firms vary depending on the type of environment in which 
they operate, including the role and importance of the market relations and networks within which a 
firm is embedded. Firms’ strategic planning and behaviour has to learn and adapt to these changing 
realities and so do our normative marketing theories.  
The development of normative marketing theory tends to be portrayed as a development from 
less to more sophisticated theories.  For example, relationship marketing can be viewed as a 
development of marketing theory that focused attention on the role and value of continuing relations 
with customers, as well as other organisations, as a means of gaining competitive advantage, rather 
than a focus on the marketing mix and individual market transactions (e.g. Anderson et al 1994, 
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Ford 1980; Gronroos 1994; Hakansson 1982; Sheth and Parvatiyar 2000).  And the subject of 
relations and networks is now a major area of research and management attention in marketing and 
other business disciplines.  
While the development of normative marketing concepts can be viewed as an evolution of 
ideas, we argue here that they more fundamentally reflect the adaptation of firms’ behaviour and 
theories of firm behaviour to changing market and competitive conditions.  As part of our analysis, 
we will show how the nature and role of relations and networks in a firm’s marketing strategy 
varies according to the type of environment in which it operates and creates different types of 
strategic problems.   
We believe it is important for theory and practice to understand the necessary match between 
normative theories of marketing and the types of environments in which they are effective and 
appropriate and when they are not. This is because normative theories appropriate for one 
environment will not work, or have only limited relevance, in other, more complex environments 
and normative theories appropriate to more complex environments will prove misleading, 
inefficient and/or ineffective in less complex environments.   
The types of differences in organisational environments we focus on here are not of the kind 
typically found in marketing and business texts.  We are not concerned with changes in the nature 
and content of specific aspects of the environment, such as the legal framework, overall market 
demand and supply conditions, or socio-economic conditions; important as they may be for 
developing and adapting specific strategies.  Instead, we focus on the generic types of strategic 
problems and uncertainties different types of environments create for firms operating in them; the 
genotypical characteristics of the environment rather than its phenotypical characteristics (Emery 
1977; Glaser 1985).  Specifically, we distinguish between four generic types of environment based 
on what Emery and Trist (1965) refer to as their causal texture or systemic properties.  This refers to 
their inherent dynamics and the way different parts of the environment are interconnected and 
interact with each other over time.  The causal texture of a firm’s environment varies by market 
context and evolves over time.  By this we do not mean that environments necessarily evolve from 
less to more complex forms over time, though there may be some truth in this.  Many patterns of 
evolution are possible in different business sectors and a given firm’s environment will comprise 
elements of more than one generic type, giving rise to different types of strategic problems and 
normative issues. 
The paper is organised as follows. First, we describe the four types of environment based on 
Emery and Trist’s (1965) classification.  This is followed by a discussion of the types of strategic 
problems and normative prescriptions appropriate to each type of environment, including the 
differing roles relations and networks within and between firms can play.  The nature and problems 
of planning and adaptation in Type 4 turbulent environments are given special attention because, 
increasingly, business environments are being described in these terms and because the complexity 
of this type of environment exceeds the ability of individual firms to cope and challenges traditional 
normative concepts of firm based strategy.  Next, drawing on recent developments in complexity 
theory, ecological systems theory and cognition, extensions to a resource or resource advantage-
based theory of the firm are proposed relevant to type 4 environments, that incorporate links 
between resources within and across firms, relations and networks.  This leads to the development 
of the concepts of the extended firm and soft assembled strategies. Finally, we consider the overall 
management and research implications arising from our analysis. 
 
The Types of Environment in which Firms Operate 
Emery and Trist’s (1965) conceptualization of organizational environments is based on an open 
systems framework and focuses attention on the types of interconnections that exist between and 
within a focal system, such as a firm, and the environmental system in which it operates.  The 
problem of adaptation for a firm is not so much to the ever-varying specific pattern of stimuli 
encountered but to the underlying structural properties of the environment that produces these 
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stimuli – for example are they a product of random variation or complex interacting systems?  The 
environment, or extended social field as it is sometimes referred to, is itself conceptualized in terms 
of its internal dynamics and interconnectedness, its causal texture, not its specific content.  Figure 1 
shows the basic framework.  Four types of interactions or links (L) are depicted, within the focal 
firm or system (L11), within the environment (L22), system to environment (L12) and environment to 
system (L21).  The problem of adaptation is that of matching the properties of the system with that 
of the relevant environment in which is operates, i.e. of aligning L11 with L22, which takes place 
through the processes of learning about environmental changes (L21), and active adaptive planning 
and response (L12) (Emery 1999).   
Figure 1 Interactions between a System and its Environment 
(Source: Emery 1977) 
 
 
Emery and Trist identify four different types of environments based on their systemic properties or 
causal texture (L22):  random placid, placid clustered, disturbed reactive and turbulent.  Each type 
poses different types of problems for planning and adaptation for systems operating in such 
environments, which may be characterized in terms of one or more of the four types of interactions 
depicted in Figure 1.  The causal texture of an environment is not fixed but may change over time as 
the relevant social field develops and evolves and as systems and their environment co-evolve. The 
four types are discussed in order of their increasing complexity but this is not meant to imply that 
this is some necessary or pre-given stage model of environmental development. First, environments 
exist within environments, such that a given business context comprises different types of 
environments with corresponding problems and issues for firms to deal with.  Second, the pattern of 
evolution depends on the co-evolution of firms and environments; on the internal and external 
interaction processes taking place over time within and among firms and environments (Aldrich 
1999). 
 
Type 1: Random Placid 
In a random placid environment is a market space of opportunities that is randomly scattered and 
does not change in response to a firm’s activities.  A firm resembles a small fish in a big pond in 
which it cannot know what will turn up next, when or from where.  In this situation there is no 
optimal location or market position or strategy to follow as any market position or strategy is 
equally likely to be beneficial or not and discovering one opportunity or problem gives no guidance 
as to the nature of other opportunities or problems. Here, no strategy is better than the best tactic 
and random behaviour, such as tossing a coin to decide the next move in market space, is just as 
good as any other move. As Emery (1977, p.6) describes it: ‘The guiding principle is “catch as 
catch can” and the characteristic forms of behaviour will necessarily be exploratory and trial and 
System Environment 
L11 
L12 
L21 
L22 
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error; vacillating from one hunch to another, even switching to contradictory hunches rather than 
being persevering or parsimonious.’  Learning in such an environment is impossible as any patterns 
detected are illusions and give no guide for future action.  
The focus of adaptation here is the focal firm itself, as all that matters is its resources, 
reflected in L11, and luck (Emery 1977). The environment is similar to what Knight (1921) refers to 
as risk, or randomness with knowable probabilities, rather than uncertainty, randomness with 
unknowable probabilities, which is characteristic of other types of environments. Given the random 
nature of the environment, larger firms or ones that have more resources to sample a larger part of 
the environment will tend to have payoffs closer to the mean value of opportunities in the 
environment.  This is because they can take advantage of the lower variance among larger samples 
due to the law of large numbers and the central limit theorem.  The mean value of opportunities 
from larger samples (searches) of the environment will more closely approach the average value in 
environment as a whole.  Smaller search areas (samples) by firms with less resources will tend to 
have greater variance, so that some will do well by chance and others not.  This leads to firm 
strategies reflected reflected in the principles of massed reserves or pooled risk in marketing, 
whereby central stocks and reserves held against uncertain demands gain cost efficiencies, such as 
in insurance (Dixon and Wilkinson 1986). 
Normative theory is limited in such conditions.  There can be no experts with superior 
knowledge and the only advice that can be offered is that firms should not waste time and effort 
trying to improve their strategies because any strategy is as good as any other and only size counts 
in absorbing the effects of such randomness. Some financial markets may appear to function in this 
way and random walk investment strategies have proved to be nearly as good as more sophisticated 
ones in some cases.   
Note that random placid is not the same as a perfectly competitive market.  In such a market 
consumers and suppliers are homogenous and perfectly informed.  But customers are randomly 
paired with suppliers as there are no transaction costs to reduce or transaction benefits to gain from 
repeated transactions.  Hence there is no value in forming relationships between customers and 
suppliers. Firms are price takers and can sell as much as they want at the prevailing price without 
affecting the price.  The optimal strategy is to produce the demanded good and offer as much as 
maximizes profit i.e. when marginal cost equals the price and U shaped cost curves are assumed 
which limit a firm’s size. 
 
Type 2: Clustered Placid Environments 
In clustered placid environments opportunities are not random but the environment is otherwise 
similar to the first type.  The environment does not change in response to a firm’s actions and it is 
neutral in the sense that it is not deliberately designed to prevent a firm’s survival or to actively seek 
to harm it. The existence of non-random aspects to the environment makes learning possible and 
valuable.  Adaptation focuses on the firm’s ability to understand and respond in appropriate ways to 
its environment, i.e. on L11 and L12, through the identification of more and less preferred market 
positions and strategic moves.  ‘In an environment where things are clustered together in time and 
place it is possible for some things to act as cues for the co-occurrence or subsequent appearance of 
other things and for others to be seen as co-producers of certain desired effects’ (Emery 1977 p.7).  
The small fish in the big pond can now learn about its environment and move to preferred locations.  
In marketing terms, a consumer orientated market strategy is called for in which firms seek to 
understand and respond to consumers’ needs through market segmentation and positioning 
strategies.  Sources of supply are also not randomly scattered and require similar differentiation and 
positioning strategies to gain access to those best suited to target customer segments.  We are able 
to rely on market research responses as clues to the actual behavior of consumers (and supply 
sources), which contrasts with a random placid environment where there would be no relation 
between research results and actual behaviour. In addition, because the environment is placid, some 
forms of cooperation among complementary market actors with non competing goals is possible, 
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such as working with customers, suppliers or distributors to improve products and services. 
However, there are still potential conflicts with customers in terms of what the best use of the firm’s 
resources are.   
Such an environment corresponds to a situation in which firms can choose their strategies so 
as to optimise returns based on an evaluation of the relative value and likely outcome of different 
alternatives.  Because firms operate in an environment that is potentially knowable, the resource 
based theory of the firm (Barney 1991) explains why firms succeed or fail in these environments; 
the firm is limited only by its own resources and competences in researching and responding to 
market opportunities.  In principle, optimal strategies can be devised using various types of 
research, analytical and optimizing techniques, which take into account the costs and benefits of 
alternatives and much of neoclassical economics has evolved to solve these types of constrained 
optimization problems (Denzau and North 1994).   
As Lane and Maxfield (1996) point out, the methods of solving this type of strategic problem 
have been and still are the dominant modes of business training and strategic planning.  In 
marketing these techniques are well represented in terms of marketing engineering (Lilien et al 
2002), which includes methods to segment markets, to identify preferable market positions and to 
design profitable market offers (Lilien and Rangaswamy 1998; 1999).  As Lilien et al (2002) argue, 
marketing engineering links the power of computers with data, knowledge and judgment to assist 
managers’ decision making.  Managers combine use of these techniques with their ability to 
identify acceptable trade offs among conflicting goals and the quality of their assumptions about 
aspects of the environment where research is too costly, limited or biased.  
 
Type 3 Disturbed Reactive Environments  
Disturbed reactive environments are clustered environments that are not placid.  There are two or 
more competitors or firms of the same type, such that they all cannot simultaneously achieve their 
goals. It is a zero sum game.  The fish is no longer small or alone.  A firm’s actions affect its 
competitors directly or indirectly through its interactions with the environment (e.g. meeting needs 
of customers so they are not available to competitors, competing for sources of supply).  The 
environment is not placid as there are competitors who can gain at other’s expense and, therefore, 
will directly or indirectly try to harm it.  Moves by a firm to a preferred location in market space 
can be disturbed by the reactions of other firms, as when two firms identify the same market niche 
as an opportunity.  In this type of environment adaptation focuses on L11, L12 and L21.  L21 becomes 
a focus of attention because of the need to respond to the intentions and capabilities of competitors. 
The relevant theory of competitive advantage in disturbed reactive environments is that of 
resource advantage theory (e.g. Hunt and Derozier 2004; Hunt and Morgan 1997), where resources 
are defined broadly to include any means by which valued products and services can be created and 
delivered.  This is an extension of the resource based theory of the firm and reflects the need for 
firms to offer products and services to customers that are preferred to competitors, i.e. are perceived 
to offer more value.  A competitive as well as a consumer orientation is required.  Thus it is not the 
existence and control of resources per se that leads to firms being able to serve customers better but 
the extent to which they result in differential advantages.  The importance of different resources for 
generating competitive advantage depends on how valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable 
they are (Barney 1991).   
Resource advantage theory is a normative theory that provides a framework for guiding firms 
in developing competitive advantage and for diagnosing sources of competitive disadvantage.  To 
determine its strategy a firm has to understand the structure of the market, which is assumed to be 
stable and unaffected by competing firms’ actions, including the resources that are important for 
creating and delivering value, the resources other firms have, and how they are likely to behave and 
respond.  
The game of business here resembles a game of chess or war.  At any stage in the game a 
player can assess their resource advantage in terms of the types of pieces they have compared to 
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their opponent and the positions they occupy relative to opponents.  This affects the types of moves 
that can be made.  But even though the rules as well as the power and behaviour of individual 
pieces is fixed, there is no one best strategy; it depends on what other players’ resources and 
strategies are.  Competition, like chess and war, is a process of interaction that takes place over 
time.  At the same time player A is acting and responding to the resources and actions of player B, 
player B is doing the same concerning player A.  Only if each perfectly predicts the behaviour of 
the other will expected outcomes occur. This only tends to occur in special circumstances, when the 
alternatives available are severely constrained, as in end games in chess.  Usually, competitors have 
many possible alternatives to consider and in these situations, as Brandenburger (1998) has pointed 
out, even in a simple two person game the complexity is fundamentally infinite. Each player is 
responding to what they think the other will do and think and what they think the other thinks they 
will do and think and so on in an infinite regress.  
There is another dimension to competitive interaction in disturbed reactive environments.  A 
new type of strategy emerges that involves out-maneuvering a competitor in order to achieve a 
strategic end, what Emery (1977) calls ‘operations’.  But competitors also can engage in misleading 
and deceptive conduct to confuse others about their actual strategies and intentions.  In other words 
competitor opportunism exists, which Williamson (1975) defines as self-seeking behaviour with 
guile.   
As each firm is anticipating and responding to others, that are in turn anticipating and 
responding to them, complex patterns of behavior emerge that are not predictable in advance, 
resulting in unavoidable uncertainty in the Knightian sense.  No firm is in control of how 
competition and outcomes develop.  Outcomes are co-produced over time through the pattern of 
interaction among players’ strategies, just as in a game of chess.  There are no optimal strategies in 
such circumstances as they are contingent on the strategies of others.  Instead, ‘strategic options 
need to be formulated more in terms of power to meet competitive challenge than simply in terms 
of achieving optimal location.’ (Emery 1977 p.9).  The power to meet competitive challenge 
depends on the ability of firms to respond to different circumstances and Alderson (1957, p.51) 
identified a key normative principle relevant for guiding interactions in such conditions - the Power 
Principle. ‘An individual or organisation, in order to prevail in the struggle for survival, must act in 
such a way as to promote the power to act.’  In other words a firm tries to take into account how 
current decisions enable or constrain future decisions and tries to avoid committing resources in 
such a way that unduly narrows future options and flexibility.   This principle is analogous to the 
type of dominant strategy that exists for all sophisticated competitive games such as Chess or Go, 
which involve getting your opponent to commit themselves while remaining still flexible yourself 
(Padgett and Ansell 1993). 
Marketing engineering and research techniques are still useful in this environment but they 
must be augmented by judgements of competitor and environmental responses as well as the focal 
firm’s own future responses.  Here the quality of management judgments become relevant and 
softer forms of data are likely to be important, such as rumour, espionage and gossip.   
Competitive theory in Type 3 environments is the realm of Game Theory in which the actions 
of each player are modeled over time under different assumptions in order to identify better 
performing strategies.  Under various assumptions and game conditions, superior strategies may be 
identified, including Nash equilibria, in which each player is willing to persist with their strategy so 
long as others do.  But such equilibria are not necessarily optimal or stable.  Simulation experiments 
based on repeated prisoner dilemma games, which involve a mix of competition and cooperation, 
show how different outcomes can emerge depending on the mix of strategies being played and the 
starting conditions (Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991).  Evolutionary models that allow firms to learn and 
adapt their strategies over time based on the outcomes of earlier interactions show some interesting 
results, including the potential emergence of cooperative behaviour among groups of competitors 
(e.g. Axelrod; 1984, 1997; Lindgren 1997), although others are more skeptical (e.g. Binmore 1998).  
Such models are far from providing clear directions for management action except in particular 
types of market auctions, where behaviour is constrained by known rules. 
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Relationship marketing concepts can play an important role in Type 3 environments.  
Relations with customers, as well as other types of organisations are potentially important resources 
that firms can use to create and sustain differential advantage by reducing transaction and 
coordinating costs, designing and adapting products and services, protecting themselves against 
competition and gaining valuable information about competitors and the market environment. (e.g. 
Dyer and Singh 1997;  Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer 2000; Kanter 1997).  Relationships as resources 
are particularly valuable because they are hard to duplicate or buy by competitors (Dyer and Singh 
1997; Andersen et al 2001). Developing relations with competitors are also potentially valuable in 
order to open up, control or suppress market competition and to develop acceptable market and 
industry standards (e.g. Grunstrom and Wilkinson 2005; Welch et al 1997) ` 
 
Type 4 Turbulent Environments 
Turbulent environments are dynamic environments like disturbed reactive environments but the 
dynamics arises not only from the actions and reactions of competitors but from within the 
environment itself.  The actions of firms not only affect competitors, they also have direct and 
indirect impacts on other aspects of the environment. The environment comprises many types of 
purposeful, interconnected, interdependent, interacting systems and evolves in response to the 
actions and interactions of those involved, leading to the emergence of new types of actors, 
relations and networks.   
The game of business in turbulent environments is like a game of chess with many players 
who can compete as well as cooperate; a game with no fixed rules, in which the pieces have goals 
of their own and interaction among pieces and players can change over time as a result of previous 
interactions, new types of pieces can arise from recombinations of existing pieces and through 
chance mutations, and where there is a no set goal by which winners and losers are clearly defined. 
Today’s winners may be tomorrow’s losers and vice versa and the game never ends.  Over time 
there is a continuous co-evolution of players and patterns of interaction, where each player 
constitutes part of each other’s environment, in which the fittest survive in the context of the 
environment that is co-created by the fittest, or as Stuart Kauffman (1996) describes it: ‘The 
winning games are the games the winners play’ (p79).   
A turbulent environment is a complex adaptive system (CAS).  Such systems arise in 
biochemical, biological, ecological, social systems as well as economic and business systems 
(Arthur et al 1997).  The behaviour of a CAS depends on the way the parts are interconnected, not 
just the characteristics of the individual parts.  No participant is in control.  Instead, order and large 
scale structures, emerge in a bottom up self-organizing way from the micro interactions taking place 
among individual actors.  Interactions and interdependencies among the parts of the overall system 
make its behaviour highly non-linear and impossible to predict.  Outcomes are very sensitive to 
starting conditions and, because the outcomes of any actor’s behaviour depend directly and 
indirectly on the behaviour and responses of many others, outcomes cannot be traced back to the 
acts of individual actors. ‘An organization reacts to the actions of others that are reacting to it.  
Much of what happens is attributable to those interactions and thus is not easily explicable as the 
consequence of autonomous action’ (March, 1996 p.283).   
Managers’ intuitions regarding how to effectively participate in such non-linear systems may 
not serve them well, as traditional approaches to solving managers' problems are based on 
mathematical methods and approaches designed to deal with linear systems that can be decomposed 
into independent subparts that can be studied and understood in isolation and for which analytical 
solutions are possible.  But as Robert May (1976, p.467), a pioneer of non-linear systems analysis 
points out: ‘The mathematical intuition so developed, ill equips the student to confront the bizarre 
behaviour exhibited by the simplest of discrete nonlinear systems… Yet such nonlinear systems are 
surely the rule, not the exception, outside the physical sciences.’  
In some ways this environment resembles the random placid environment and may appear to 
be so for an individual actor.  But it is not random.  It obeys rules of behaviour and interaction that 
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defy closed form solutions, even if we could write down the underlying behavioral equations.  It is 
an example of strong uncertainty in the Knightian sense (Denzau and North 1994).  The focus of 
adaptation now includes all types of firm and emvironment interactions i.e. L11, L12, L21 and L22 : ‘In 
turbulent environments adaptation is not possible unless somehow one comes to grips with the L22’ 
(Emery 1977 p 10). 
How does a firm come to grips with such a complex and dynamic environment and what 
kinds of normative theories are relevant to guide the behaviour of participants in such systems?  As 
we will argue in the following section, one way this is accomplished is not through the planning and 
strategic actions of individual firms but through the sensing and response of networks of firms co-
created through their actions, interactions and relationships over time.  Such networks are more able 
to recognize and cope with the uncertainties involved and call for different types of competences 
and skills on the part of participant firms in order to contribute productively to and benefit from the 
self-organising process by which such networks are created and changed.  
 
Normative Marketing and Management Theory in Type 4 Environment 
Turbulence and Type 4 Environments 
The term turbulence is often used to describe environments in which individual firms face strong 
uncertainties because of the complex nature of environments resulting in rapid and unexpected 
change.  Indeed, Mintzberg (1993) points out that turbulence of this kind has tended to be ascribed 
to the current environment in every age and that the patterns and directions of change only become 
clearer in hindsight.  Here we wish to make a distinction between environments in which individual 
firms may face significant uncertainties and environments that are inherently unpredictable because 
of the degree of interdependence and interactions taking place in the overall socio-economic system 
of which individual firms are but one part.   
Whether a particular environment is a Type 4 is not determined simply by the degree of 
uncertainty individual firms face, which can arise for various reasons (e.g. Lane et al 1996).  For 
example, hypercompetition (D’Aveni 1994, 1999) is a source of extreme uncertainty that results 
from a rapidly increased pace of change in forms and types of competition and is often confused 
with turbulence.  Firms deliberately try to disrupt markets and undermine rival’s sources of 
competitive advantage in an ever escalating race to achieve temporary rather than sustainable forms 
of competitive advantage.  Temporary partnerships with other organisations can play a part in this 
process of seeking out and exploiting ways of disrupting competition for short-term advantages.  
But as Selvey et al (2003) point out this is an extreme form of a disturbed reactive environment, not 
a Type 4 environment.  The game of business is still a continuous succession of prisoner dilemma 
type games played among rivals and the focus is on ways to compete, not on any indirect 
consequences for other parts of the system, such as the near breakdown of the heath care system in 
some parts of the US or the waste and polluting effects of industry (Selvey et al 2003; Diamond 
2004).   
Effective strategy in Type 4 environments requires that second and third order effects of 
actions are considered because they have significant direct and indirect feedback effects on the 
competitors and the larger system in which they operate.  However, the ability to recognize, 
understand and cope with these effects is beyond that of the individual organization.  It is also 
beyond the abilities of centrally directed and coordinated networks of relationships, such as 
strategic networks (Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer 2000; Jarillo 1988) or network forms of internal 
organisation (e.g. Achrol and Kotler 1999; Ghoshal and Bartlett 1990).  Although a centrally 
directed network permits the lead actor to avail themselves of various types of collaborative 
advantages via the resources of others it can access and help co-create (Kanter 1994), the overall 
variety of responses is necessarily restricted by the vision and schemas of the lead actor.  Network 
forms within an organization suffer even more from this problem, as the network is constituted 
within the boundary of one firm.   
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Strategic networks and network forms of organisation are essentially types of response to 
disturbed reactive environments (Type 3). They focus on rivalry between networks as opposed to 
individual firms.  But Type 4 environments refer to conditions in which the environment is beyond 
the capacity of an individual firm to deal with, no matter how internally organized it may be and no 
matter how well it is able to orchestrate the behaviour and interactions of other organisations in its 
strategic network.  In any period there will always be winners and losers but no one firm or strategic 
network is able to cope with all possible contingencies through time.   
Type 4 environments are typified by periods of radical restructuring of industry and firm 
boundaries and discontinuous change, such as were wrought by the coming of the railways, 
telephone, electricity and the internet.  In these cases technological developments disrupted 
previously established forms of interaction, competition and industry structure until new forms 
emerge to take their place. An illustration of this type of change is provided by Lane and Maxfield 
(1996) in terms of the evolution of the firm ROLM and PBX computer based systems.  They show 
how the impact of new technologies led to the emergence of new types of products, actors and 
relationships that could not be foreseen, planned or intended.  Existing customer-supplier relations 
were undermined, new patterns of interaction and relations formed within and between firms in the 
industry.  The knowledge and learning that co-developed between firms as a result of these 
interactions led to radical and unexpected adaptations of strategy including redirections in terms of 
both ends and means. 
We should re-emphasise that environments with different types of causal textures can co-exist 
because there are environments within environments (Emery 1998).  Hence for some sectors and 
regions of industry and for some dimensions of a firm’s strategic action space, non Type 4 
environments may exist such that they can follow normative strategies borne of these ‘simpler’ 
environments or sub-environments.  For example, in the PBX example referred to above 
competitive games were still played out between particular actors over time (Type 3 environment), 
customer preferences varied over time and place calling for variations in systems, products and 
solutions adapted to particular requirements (Type 2 environment), and chance events dictated why 
particular actors or relations gained or lost at particular times and places (Type 1 environment).   
But how does a firm cope with a type 4 turbulent environment, which is inherently 
unpredictable a priori and in which opportunities and outcomes emerge in a self organizing way 
from the local patterns of interaction, learning and adaptation taking place?  Should they continue to 
try to construct, reconstruct and direct internal and external networks in order to seek at least 
temporary competitive advantage?  Or are new types of strategies called for?  A key insight is that 
the relevant unit of coping and response is not the individual firm or lead actor but the network 
itself.  Hence a firm has to learn not only how to adapt its interactions with the environment and 
competitors but also how to effectively participate in and learn from the networks of relations in 
which it is actually or potentially embedded.   
A useful analogy is the way social insect colonies behave (Bonabeau, Dorigo and Theraulaz 
1999).  In social insect colonies there are no leaders.  Instead, coordinated and directed action takes 
place through ‘rules’ of direct and indirect (e.g. via pheromones) interaction with other members of 
the colony and the environment. These rules have evolved in the context of their particular 
environment in order for the colony to survive and are hardwired in to their genes.  Directly and 
indirectly their individual actions and responses co-construct the ant or bee colony, including the 
way it houses itself, breeds, takes care of its young, searches for and shares food, and how it 
recognizes and responds to opportunities and threats inside and outside the colony. All this is done 
without any central direction (Beekman and Wilkinson 2004).   
If the environment changes so that existing rules of interaction do not produce viable colony 
behaviour, a struggle for survival will take place.  Colonies will take different evolutionary paths in 
their ‘search’ for a new, viable set of rules of interaction, which are affected by genetic variations 
among colonies which give them different starting conditions, by historical circumstances and by 
path dependencies and random mutations.  Eventually, existing species become extinct or take on 
new forms and new types of species emerge that may redefine what we mean by ants and bees.  We 
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and the ants and bees do not know how many evolutionary stable interaction strategies may exist 
and their number may well be quite limited, as studies of evolutionary convergence suggest (Morris 
2003).   
Do we have any normative theories that would help an individual ant or bee cope with these 
conditions?  No, each ant does not have the resources or knowledge to cope alone; their behavior 
and its outcomes for them and the colony are unknown and unknowable for the individual ant, as 
they depend on what other ants do and the conditions they face.  Moreover, even for a fully 
informed outside observer, the outcomes of collective ant behaviour and interactions are not 
knowable because the colony is a complex adaptive system; a non-linear system in which many 
possible equilibria exist to which the behaviour of the colony is attracted (hence the name 
attractors) depending on starting conditions, the type of stimuli experienced and random elements 
(e.g. Bonabeau,  Dorigo and Theraulaz 1999; Omerod 2001).   
 
Strategies for Type 4 Turbulence 
While an ant or bee cannot alter its own rules of interaction, humans and firms actively seek to 
understand and manipulate their interactions with the environment and each other.  They can 
change both their interpretation of themselves and their environment and - at least to some extent – 
the way they interact with others.  Such adaptations to turbulent environments can be both 
maladaptive or adaptive.  First we consider maladaptive responses. 
 
a) Maladaptive Responses and Type 5 Environments.  Coping with turbulence involves attempts to 
adapt to or reduce the level of relevant uncertainty.  Emery (1977) identifies three types of 
responses to turbulence that are maladaptive: superficiality, segmentation and dissociation.  
Superficiality involves reducing the relevant uncertainty by lowering emotional investments 
in the ends being pursued.  This is reflected in managers following ritualistic formal planning 
procedures they do not believe in but do not know what else to do (Stacey 1996). For example, 
Mintzberg (1993) points out how formal planning can become a substitute for control in large 
organisations rather than a means of control; an illusion that reduces management anxiety, allowing 
them to sleep better at night. Planning becomes an end in itself and a form of public relations that 
avoids dealing with the essential uncertainties confronting the firm. 
Segmentation involves breaking the system into smaller, less complex systems that are 
insulated from each other.  Emery (1977, p.31) sees this in terms of  ‘the enhancement of ingroup-
outgroup prejudices as people seek to simplify their choices.’  In business, industry protection 
schemes, trade barriers and trade blocks are attempts to reduce interdependencies and protect local 
business communities.  The recent strong protests at world trade forums also reflect people’s beliefs 
that reducing the international interactions among economies and firms can reduce the complexities 
and uncertainties for individual nations and firms.  Loyalty schemes, cooperatives and tied 
relationships can also be manifestations of segmentation.   
Lastly, dissociation is the denial of the potential contribution of coordinating with others over 
individual selfish action and is ‘characterized by indifference, callousness and cynicism toward 
others and to existing institutional arrangements’ (Emery 1977, p.32).  In business the ‘greed is 
good’ type slogan represents this as well as a strategic focus on business relations with an 
adversarial and zero-sum perspective in which the problem is primarily to reduce dependence, gain 
power, guard against opportunism and supress conflict.  As one manager put it: ‘The conventional 
wisdom is that business is war, cooperation is for wimps, and winning is everything.  Boundaries 
must therefore be firmly established and defended, communication restricted.’ (James 1994) 
These maladaptive responses have led some to propose a Type 5 environment or hyper-
turbulence:  ‘the condition in which environmental demands finally exceed the collective adaptive 
capacities of members sharing an environment’ (McCall and Selvey 1984, p. 460).  Such an 
environment results from participants’ attempts to reduce or avoid the inherent uncertainties 
through one or more of Emery’s maladaptive strategies.  Such strategies would dampen the 
Page 11  
turbulence and uncertainty by reducing the degree of interconnectivity in the environment.  And 
research on the stability and behavior of complex systems shows how changes in the degree of 
connectivity has important effects, moving a system from regimes of chaotic to more ordered 
behavior (Gardner and Ashby 1970; Kauffman 1992; May 1972, 1974).  The maladaptive strategies 
reduce interdependence by partitioning the environment into separate subsystems with very 
restricted interaction, what McCall and Selvey (1984) refer to as social enclaves and social vortices.  
Those that are able to collectively cope with the sub-environment, as defined by their own existence 
and separation, form social enclaves.  Social vortices are comprised of those who cannot cope, out-
groups that are relegated to the margins of society.  The examples given are South Africa before the 
end of Apartheid and the decoupling of segments of US and other societies into ghettos, and 
survivalist communities.   
 
b) Adaptive Responses to Type 4 Environments.  The challenge posed by turbulent environments 
has led to various proposals regarding appropriate ways for managers and firms to respond.  These 
focus on the importance of participating, learning and knowledge development (Senge 1990), 
adaptive strategies (Wilkinson and Young 2002) and improvisation (Cherlaru et al 2002; Moorman 
and Miner 1998).  Such strategies recognize that firms are fallible; they have limited information 
and operate in a complex adaptive system with many possible types of outcomes that are a priori 
unknown and unknowable.  Therefore a chosen strategy is a kind of hypothesis to be changed, both 
in terms of targeted outcomes and means, in response to feedback as the firm muddles through 
(Lindblom 1959).  In this process of muddling through the firm changes its plans in a continuous 
way as new ends and new opportunities as well as new means to reach existing ends are discovered, 
recognized and responded to (Collander, 2003).  The patterns of interactions and relations managers 
and firms have, directly and indirectly, with others in and outside the firm play a key role in this 
process as they are a source of learning, adaptation and response.   
The role of relations is exemplified in Lane and Maxfield’s (1996) concept of  generative 
relationships.  These shape the way a manager or firm makes sense of its environment, including the 
relevance of different types of actors, their actual and potential roles and functions, and the way it 
acts in relations to others (Lane et al 1996).  In the PBX case the example is given of the impact of 
the interactions between technical managers (TM) in customer firms and ROLM, a supplier of new 
types of computer based systems.  These interactions affected the way ROLM understood and 
approached the market in terms of target market segments, products and systems, it altered the 
position of TM managers in their firms, it affected the interactions among TMs leading to new 
customers for ROLM and undermined relations between TMs and other suppliers.  The problem is 
that such generative relations and their outcomes cannot be anticipated in advance or predicted from 
a knowledge of participants; they emerge through participating in such relations over time (Lane et 
al 1996).  Hence the firm has an ongoing task of monitoring, interpreting and reinterpreting existing 
and potential patterns of interactions and their meaning.  
Emery (1977) also focuses on the key role of relations and networks as the means of coping 
with turbulent environments.  He explains this in terms of the emergence of widely shared values 
and ideals between organisations and how these relate to the fundamental dimensions of choice. 
These values and ideals are not some new age version of business philosophy and they are not 
achieved in the same way as other types of business goals such as market share or profits. Instead 
they act as guides to the choice and adaptation of goals and objectives in the face of the 
fundamental uncertainties of turbulent environments; they are kinds of shared mental models that 
help in the choice and adaptation of our goals (Danzau and North 1994).   
‘Ideals enable people: 
1. To maintain continuity of direction and social cohesiveness by choosing 
another objective when one is achieved or the effort to achieve it has failed; 
2. To sacrifice objectives in a manner consistent with the maintenance of 
direction and cohesion.’ (Emery, 1977, p69) 
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The four dimensions of choice used by Emery as the basis for identifying appropriate values 
and ideals are probability of choice, probable effectiveness, probable outcome and relative value 
(Ackoff and Emery 1972).   
Homony and probability or scope of choice and response. The first ideal relates to improving 
the probability or range of choice by increasing homony.  At a personal level this involves more 
closely relating to others such as neighbours, workmates, etc., through which people will improve 
their range of choice.  ‘The experience of others is a prime source of ‘familiarity with’ the world, 
and ‘the others’ are usually best able to provide access to a wider range of course of action.’ (Emery 
1977, p72).  In a similar way, improved coordination and cooperation between and within firms is a 
means for expanding the action possibilities for all.  
Nurturance and Probable Effectiveness.  The second ideal focuses on resource creation and 
development through relations and networks.  Specifically it focuses on promoting the ability to act 
and the effectiveness of our actions and responses through cultivating and developing our own as 
well as other’s competences and resources.  We are concerned with growing the garden (productive 
relations and networks) as opposed to just picking the flowers (using relations to meet current 
objectives).  This can be viewed as an extension of Alderson’s Power Principle to involve the role 
of others’ actions and capabilities in promoting our own. 
Humanity and Probability of Outcome.  The probability of outcome derives from the first two 
components of choice and thus presumes homony and nurturance.  Here the focus is on the use of 
others as ends versus means or as Norbet Weiner expressed it ‘Towards the human use of human 
beings’ (Emery 1977 p75).  At any time firms and people have many different objectives they may 
pursue. Choosing among them according to humanitarian ideals means not necessarily choosing the 
best in terms of achieving economic or technical goals but one that fits our nature. Emery sees the 
ultimate guide here in terms of ‘good for whom’ and interprets this in terms of how individuals are 
affected not organisations. Organisations are merely the local environments or habitats within 
which individuals seek out their ideals, organisations themselves are not ideal seeking. 
Beauty and Relative Value.  The last ideal seems at first remote from the business of business 
but it is not; it deals with the interrelations of purposes or ends themselves. Ideals only emerge in 
social systems in which inherent uncertainties arise from the interlocking purposes and goals of the 
actors involved; from the interdependencies that exist among them.  Beauty is used as the term for a 
higher order rationality, which somehow rationalizes and synthesizes the inherent conflicts of 
interlocking purposes within a higher rationality or order of ends.  In regard to business systems the 
higher order logic would seem to refer to the operations and maintenance of the overall market 
directed process itself and to the protection and maintenance of the material, biological and social 
environment.  It is through the market process, that winners and losers with conflicting purposes are 
sorted out, in such a way that it sustains and strengthens the process itself i.e. the pursuit of 
interlocked purposes through the market process, permits and stimulates the overall process to 
continue and enlarges our desires and possibilities. Emery (1977) expresses this in a more general 
way: ‘… men will increasingly choose and more consciously strive to choose those purposes that 
manifest intentions calculated to stimulate both themselves and others to expand their horizons of 
desire and to rationalize conflict’ (p76). 
Maladaptive strategies are examples of behaviour that constrains future desires and 
possibilities whereas adaptive strategies open up possibilities. The principle is a type of extension to 
Alderson’s power principle mentioned above.  It is not just the individual actor that seeks to act so 
as to maximize its own ability to act but to act and interact with others in such a way that enlarges 
the resources, capabilities and desires of all interacting market actors.  Perhaps we should call this 
the social power principle. 
 
The Extended Firm and the Role of Relationships and Networks 
Lane and Maxfield’s (1996) The concept of generative relationships (Lane and Maxfield 1996) and 
the values and ideals identified by Emery (1977) highlight the importance of relationships and 
Page 13  
networks in coping with Type 4 turbulence.  Further support for the role and importance of 
relationships and networks comes from the Principle of Requisite Variety (Ashby 1954), where it is 
argued that in order to respond to its environment, systems have to be able to match its variety or 
complexity, otherwise they will eventually confront conditions with which they cannot cope.  Over 
time environmental complexity in general has progressively increased, due to the increasing number 
of people and organisations, which are ever more interconnected and in which the frequency and 
speed of interaction and response is also increasing.  We have moved from simpler hunter-gatherer 
societies, through early civilizations and the industrial revolution to modern globalized industries 
and societies (Diamond 1999).  Such changes lead to the emergence of different forms of 
organisation to cope with the increasing complexity (Bar-Yam 1997, 2001).   
A critical point is reached when the complexity of the environment exceeds that of an 
individual person or firm (Bar-Yam 1997, 2001).  This means that central direction from a single 
coordinator, no matter how well supported and informed they may be, cannot cope because of limits 
to an individual’s complexity.  Similarly, single firms lack the requisite variety to cope with a 
highly complex environment.  However, networks of organisations, in which knowledge, 
coordination and direction is distributed and behaviour emerges from the interactions taking place 
among those involved, have far greater intrinsic variety and therefore greater ability to cope with 
complexity.  The business network itself functions as a kind of collective mind that is more 
‘intelligent’ and able to adapt than the individual firms comprising it, yet it is formed out of those 
firms and the way they interact and respond to each other.  The network mind is implicit and 
embedded in the patterns of interrelations within and among the actors.  For example consider the 
following description of the Toyota production system: 
‘Toyota’s knowledge of how to make cars lies embedded in highly specialized social 
and organisational relationships that have evolved through decades of common effort. It 
rests in routines, information flows, ways of making decisions, shared attitudes and 
expectations, and specialized knowledge that Toyota managers, workers, suppliers and 
purchasing agents, and others have about different aspects of their business, about each 
other, and about how they all can work together’ (Badaracco 1989). 
Another example is the identification of productive technological partnerships from among a 
set of firms as described by Wolpert (2002).  Here the aim is to bring together a set of firms with 
potentially valuable technological complementarities and facilitate the identification of productive 
relations within the group.  The ability to do that depends on the assortment of firms in the group, 
from which potential collaborations can be identified.  These are not properties of the individual 
members but a joint property of the group (Leonard and Swap 1999). 
 
Extending Resource-Advantage Theory to Relations and Networks 
Resource-advantage theory (Hunt and Morgan 1997) may be extended to incorporate the role of 
relations and networks.  To explain this, we start by considering the individual firm and its 
resources and how they contribute to its performance. We then consider the contribution of 
connections between firms. 
Resource advantage theory argues that a firm’s market position is a function of the resources 
it controls.  These include tangible and intangible elements and the competences and skills 
embedded in the people, teams, relations and networks comprising the firm.  These resources are 
combined in complex ways over time to produce the plans, actions and responses that characterise 
the firm and the way it responds to its environment, including competitors.  In turn these plans, 
actions and responses determine the firm’s market position.   
The contribution of a particular resource to the firm’s competitive position is not easy to 
assess for a number of reasons.  First, the contribution of a resource will vary over time and across 
markets depending on the type of value to be created and delivered and the technologies available.  
Second, the contribution depends on the distribution of the resource, as well as substitutes, among 
competitors and the ease with which it may be appropriated, duplicated or substituted for.  Third, 
the contribution of a resource depends in part on the other resources of a firm.  This is because 
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resources are not used in isolation; they are combined and used in complex ways over time as firms 
act and respond to their environment in their struggle to survive and prosper.  Interaction effects 
occur among resources that affect their actual and potential contribution to a firm’s competitive 
position.  For example, a superior market research department is of limited value if the firm does 
not have the ability to translate this research into viable products and services.  Lastly, a firm’s 
actions and the results obtained have feedback effects on the mix and value of their resources for 
use in the future. Some are used up or deteriorate; others grow and are enhanced - such as 
knowledge and learning.  
The problem here is analogous to that of determining the effect of different genes on the 
characteristics of a resulting organism. The organism’s genome may be equated to the assortment of 
resources that a firm has that enable it to behave in particular ways in order to survive and prosper 
in its environment.   The organism or phenotype that results from the expression of genes over time 
in an environment is equivalent to the organisation and behaviour of a firm that results from the 
expression of its resources in its environment.  This equating of resources to genes is consistent 
with Nelson and Winter’s (1982) use of the term ‘routines’ as genes i.e. regular and predictable 
behavioural patterns.  These routines ‘include characteristics of firms that range from technical 
routines for producing things, through hiring and firing, ordering new inventory, or stepping up 
production items in high demand, to policies regarding investment, research and development.’ 
(p14).  Such routines reflect the tangible and intangible resources available to a firm, including the 
competences and skills of firms in using and combining resources.  Moreover, the use of resources 
reinforces or replicates their use to the extent they result in benefits or ‘fitness’ for the firm as a 
whole and are replenished by the actions of the firm.  For example, the use of a firm’s knowledge 
and research skills to produce competitive marketing strategies reinforces the use of and replenishes 
these knowledge and research skills.   
Resources, like genes, do not act in isolation but interact over time as they are used in 
combination to create a type of firm with a particular organisation and behaviour repertoire. Firms 
are selected for based on the fitness of their behaviour in the relevant market environment, there is 
no absolute standard for judging the fitness contribution of a resource or gene.  Fitness depends on 
the context, including the other resources of the firm and the resources of other firms and 
organisations.  Like genes, individual resources contribute to (or hinder) fitness and survival in the 
presence of other resources, which in turn contribute (or hinder) fitness in the presence of them.  In 
one context a resource may be extremely valuable in another irrelevant or harmful, such as the 
value of a market research department in a random placid environment or a perfectly competitive 
market compared to a clustered or disturbed reactive environment.  
A simple example will serve to illustrate how resources are interconnected within and across 
firms.  It is adapted from biological examples described by Dawkins (1983).  Resources can be used 
in various ways by firms depending on their objectives and the other resources at their disposal.  
Consider how we may determine the effect of a particular resource, A, e.g. a design department, on 
the competitive market position of a firm.  First, we may imagine comparing firms competing in 
similar markets with or without this resource and see how well they do in terms of market share, 
price premium, or customer loyalty etc.  We may find that resource A is associated with gaining a 
price premium.  Is resource A the resource ‘for’ price premiums?  As Dawkins notes, we can only 
determine the effect of a proposed cause by comparison with another potential cause. Let us assume 
there are two firms with resources A1 and A2, which can be thought of as two kinds of design 
departments.  To keep it simple assume there are two kinds of firm outcomes - a price premium or a 
price discount (P1 and P2).  In order to make the comparison we will assume all the other resources 
of the firms are the same and the two firms are not competing against each other. If we find that, 
statistically, firms with A1 are more likely to get price premiums (P1 rather than P2) than firms 
with A2 we may conclude that A1 is a resource leading to price premiums. If price premiums are a 
key to a superior market position and success in the market, firms with A1 will prosper and other 
firms may try to build the same type of design department.  
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Although A1 appears to lead to P1, this may also depend on the other resources of the firm 
which may suppress or enhance the likelihood of P1.  There may be another resource B, the type of 
advertising department, that interacts with A1.  Suppose there are two kinds of advertising 
departments B1 and B2, and B1 may not get on well with design departments, particularly A1.  The 
presence of B1 may interfere with the activities of A1 directly, or they may be unable to reflect the 
designs of A1 well in their campaigns.  Hence, if all firms have A1 but do not get a price premium 
if they have B1, then B1 not A1 becomes the resource for gaining a price premium (P1).  In other 
words both resource A and B are potential causes of price premiums depending on the resource 
assortments that exist in the population of firms.  
We may extend this argument to relationships and networks. The contribution of a resource 
not only depends on the other resources within the firm, it also depends on the resources of other 
firms with which a firm is interconnected.  In this way one firm’s resources may find their 
expression in a related firm’s organisation and behaviour, not just their own organisation and 
behaviour.  What we define as the phenotype associated with any genes, or in our case resources, is 
arbitrary as the chain of cause and effect links extends beyond individual bodies or organisations, to 
their behaviour and to other bodies and organisations; to what Dawkins (1983) refers to as the 
extended phenotype. 
A firm’s resources are indirectly combined with the resources of connected other firms and 
organisations resulting in impacts on the organisation and behaviour of these connected others.  
Hence a firm’s resource may not just affect its own competitive position but also the competitive 
position of others. This is clearly the case when firms outsource different functions to specialist 
firms in order to make use of their resources and hence a supplier’s resources contribute indirectly 
to the organisation, behaviour and competitive position of its customers.  For example, a supplier’s 
production and design department enhances or hinders the work of the customer’s internal 
production and design department and in turn their relations with other departments such as 
advertising.  The type of relationships a firm has with its suppliers affects the contribution of the 
supplier’s skills and competences to the organisation and behaviour of the customer.   
The networks of relationships in which firms are embedded may be viewed as extended 
phenotypes in which the resources of the firms comprising the network directly and indirectly 
contribute to its pattern of organisation and behaviour as well as to the reinforcement and 
reproduction of the resources required to continue this pattern depending on which patterns succeed.  
To use Dawkins’ (1983) phrase this is ‘resource action at a distance’ – not within one firm but 
across firms.  Furthermore, the resources of other firms that influence a particular characteristic of 
the extended phenotype may be in conflict or support each other, just as they do in the case of 
genes. All the firms involved are not necessarily cooperating with each other; there is still room for 
conflict in terms of the resource impacts and interlocking objectives of those involved.  The 
extended phenotype is jointly manipulated, not necessarily in a cooperative manner, by the 
resources, actions and interactions of directly and indirectly related firms who may span different 
types of industries and technologies.   
The important point is that the unit of analysis moves beyond the individual firm to the 
network of interconnected firms that together co-produce the behaviour and organisation of the 
network.  The survival and performance of individual firms is based on the organization and 
behaviour of this extended phenotype.  Dawkins’s (1983, p.233) central theorem of the extended 
phenotype is that: ‘An animal’s behaviour tends to maximise the survival of the genes ‘for’ that 
behaviour, whether or not those genes happen to be in the body of the particular animal performing 
it.’  Analogously, we postulate that a firm’s behaviour tends to reinforce the resources that enable 
that behaviour, whether or not those resources happen to be part of that firm’s resources or some 
other connected firm’s resources.   
Natural selection in the market works on the basis of outcomes.  The outcomes of firms’ 
plans, actions and responses have feedback effects on their resources, including their skills, 
competences and knowledge, as well as on their objectives and future plans and interactions. Firms, 
relations and networks are selected for and evolve based on the outcomes of their actions and 
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interactions, which in turn affects the conglomeration of resources underlying network behaviour.  
The network, its membership and its resources change and evolve over time.  New types of firms 
with different characteristic interaction and response patterns emerge as well as new types of 
relations.   
Through extended phenotypic effects the interaction behaviour of firms can be indirectly 
affected by the resources and behaviour of connected firms, which can result in patterns of 
interactive behaviour becoming instituted in a network that facilitates or inhibits cooperative 
behaviour. Examples of this are to be found in studies of the evolution of cooperative behaviour 
among selfish actors in iterated prisoner dilemma games and other types of interaction situations 
(e.g. Axelrod 1985, 1997; Lindgren 1997; Padgett 1997; Sanchez and Quester 2004).  The survival 
of such cooperative patterns of behaviour depends on whether it is evolutionarily stable, i.e. 
whether it can survive despite shocks such as ‘invasion’ by other types of strategies, including those 
that are more adversarial or non-cooperative.   
The extended phenotype view of firms implies a need for a change in management philosophy 
away from a focus on marketing engineering for the individual firm as an independent market actor 
and on adversarial relations, to one that presumes the existence of interdependent others and where 
trust and openness are strongly positively valued (Emery 1977).  This appears naïve at first.  Surely 
any firm openly espousing such ideals would be too easily taken advantage of because of the 
dependence that would be created on others.  This is indeed the case because the ability of a firm to 
prosper through the pursuit of more cooperative strategies depends on the strategies of other firms 
in the population.  So how can such ideals and strategies emerge in a population of firms?  There 
are two basic types of models (Dawkins 1983).  Model 1 focuses on the relational or network level.  
We can envisage a number of competing relationships or networks with different combinations of 
resources and associated degrees of cooperation and coordination and argue that selection will 
favour the more cooperative nets in the long run.  But such a model does not explain how 
cooperative strategies came to be effective.  In Model 2 the focus is on the individual firm and its 
resources.  Selection in turbulent environments will tend to favour firms with resources, including 
relationship and networking skills and competences that enable them to interact more harmoniously 
with other firms in the population, including existing and potential members of their networks.  This 
type of selection mechanism, in which resources are selected for based on the frequency of other 
resources in the environment, is an example of what is called frequency-dependent selection in 
population genetics (Dawkins 1983).  For example, social insect colonies are extreme examples of 
cooperatively interacting entities whose genes have been selected for based on their ability to 
harmoniously and productively interact with other genes in the insect colony’s gene pool as well as 
with external environments.  Closer to business, frequency-dependent selection has been 
demonstrated in the simulations by Axelrod (1980, 1997) and others that show how groups of 
cooperators can emerge and prosper over time in populations of selfish competitors. 
Relationships involve a joint choice and investment; firms need to be chosen as well as to 
choose partners, unless they are in very powerful positions.  Hence part of the strategic problem, for 
a firm is to compete to cooperate, to be able to join and remain in viable relations and networks 
(Wilkinson and Young 2002).  In order to do this it has to devote resources to attracting relationship 
partners, becoming attractive as a relationship partner and heading off rivals - the business 
equivalent of sexual selection in biology (Wilkinson et al 2003).  As Darwin (1874) noted in his 
second great work, much of biological evolution is unexplainable simply in terms of natural 
selection – the ability to survive and adapt to local conditions.  There is also a struggle to reproduce 
in order for genes to survive into the future generations and this depends on finding sexual mates 
and ensuring the survival of your own progeny.  Features that do not appear to be advantageous in 
the business of living, and in fact may be downright harmful (e.g. long tails), may evolve to 
increase attractiveness and hence aid sexual selection.  In the same way the evolution of viable 
relations and networks in turbulent business environments requires the evolution of firms who can 
establish cooperative partnerships, which may make them both more vulnerable as well as more 
attractive. 
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The rise of relationship marketing and concepts of collaborative advantage, partnering and the 
like suggests that the population of firms and their resources is changing in favour of those with 
more cooperative abilities and more cooperative firms will survive in populations of cooperators.  
However, from an individual firm’s perspective, adopting cooperative strategies is still not easy, 
especially if they begin from a history of previously adversarial relations.  But there are studies 
reporting how firms have attempted to change the nature of their relations with key others, starting 
with small, less risky actions to build a cooperative trusting relation (e.g. Corbett, Blackburn and 
van Wassenhove 1999; Holmen, Hakansson and Petersson 2003; Welch et al 1998). As these cases 
make plain, relationship building takes time and is an area requiring more research attention.  
 
Soft Assembled Strategies 
The foregoing shows that the complexity of turbulent environments requires firms to reach out 
beyond their boundaries and build relationships to access, build on, and to evolve understanding and 
response capabilities.  Survival depends on the adaptation of the overall relational network, 
including changes in the nature of individual actors and their links.  There is no guarantee that a 
particular focal firm will survive as a recognizable entity in the future, but through its actions and 
responses it will have played a part in the evolutionary and self organizing process taking place; 
similar to the way biological evolution occurs.  The problem for the firm is therefore to participate 
in the game of business through its interactions and responses to others in such a way that the game 
evolves in ways that it continues to be included as a viable player. But as the nature of evolution of 
business ecosystems cannot be foreseen; there are no magic strategies or prescriptions that can 
guarantee future survival.   
This is not a very comfortable type of normative theory of management because it gives no 
clear guides for action and results in a number of paradoxes (Hakansson and Ford 2002).  Under 
these circumstances the role of management and strategy in firms changes from one of designing 
optimal relationships and strategies to what may be described as soft assembled strategies (Andy 
Clark 1997).  Although developed in the context of individual behaviour and cognition, we believe 
this concept has direct counterparts in business and marketing.  The extended view of the firm is 
similar to the concept of the embodied mind in cognitive science Clark (1997), in which the mind, 
body and local environment are viewed as part of a dispersed and extended mind that is the sensing, 
thinking and responding system of a person.  Thus, we sense and think in part with our body and 
with parts of our local environment.  We do not, for example, solve the problem of picking up a 
piece of paper by issuing commands to our muscles to act; we enlist the innate characteristics of our 
arms and fingers to solve the problem.  The technologies, tools and equipment we use, including 
language and other people, become part of our extended self in the same way that the stick of a 
blind person becomes part of them and the way they sense and respond to the world.  They do not 
simply extend and enhance existing skills and abilities or remedy a defect but provide new forms of 
functionality, creating new niches for action and intervention.  For example, e-mail is not a 
replacement for face to face communication: ‘It provides a complementary functionality, allowing 
people informally and rapidly to interact, while preserving and inspectable and revistable space.’ 
(Clark 2003 p110, emphasis in original).  Clark argues that humans are natural-born cyborgs able to 
expand and reinvent our sense of body and action, that our body image and boundary is highly 
negotiable, and our brain’s plasticity enables it to learn to exploit new kinds of feedback loops and 
action potential that come from being linked to external systems and technologies.  We sense, think 
and act with our environment by learning from it and drawing on its intrinsic response tendencies 
such that our body and the local environment become part of the means of solving problems not 
their source.  As Clark (1997) summarises it: 
 ‘The job of the [central nervous system] … is not to bring the body increasingly ‘into 
line’ so that it can carry out detailed internally represented commands directly specifying 
e.g. arm trajectories. Rather the job is to learn to modulate parameters (such as stiffness), 
which will then interact with intrinsic bodily and environmental constraints so as to yield 
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desired outcomes.  In sum, the task is to learn how to soft-assemble adaptive behaviors in 
ways that respond to local context and exploit intrinsic dynamics.  Mind, body, and world 
thus emerge as equal partners in the construction of robust, flexible behaviors’ (p45, 
emphases in original)  
In much the same way we can view the manager and individual firm expanding and 
reinventing their sensing, thinking and responding potential with and through their internal and 
external networks of relationships.  To adapt the words of Clark (1997) to business we argue that: 
‘The job of the manager is not to bring the firm increasingly into line, so that it can 
carry out detailed plans centrally developed, such as how to position and carry out 
marketing activities for a product or service.  Rather the manager’s job is to learn to 
modulate parameters of the organization, such as its customer responsiveness, its 
relationship and network competences, which will then interact with intrinsic firm, 
relationship and network constraints so as to yield desired outcomes.  In sum, the task is to 
learn how to soft assemble adaptive behaviours in ways that respond to local intra and 
interfirm context and exploit intrinsic dynamics.  Managers, firm and network thus emerge 
as equal partners in the construction of robust, flexible behaviours.’  
The example of ROLM referred to above and the way it identified and participated in various 
types of generative relations as it felt its way forward in the PBX market is an example of a soft 
assembled strategy.  The original strategies and interpretations of the market of ROLM and others 
changed in response to participation in relations and, at the same time, changed the pattern of 
relations.  Soft assembled strategies are also reflected in the ways lead users have been incorporated 
into the innovation process (Franke and von Hippel 2002; von Hippel, 2001), such as the 
development of chef packs to enable meals designed by chefs to be easily mass-produced (von 
Hippel, 2001).  The problem was that of scaling up production of new types of meals designed by 
chefs in their kitchens for catering firms, airlines and packaged gourmet meals.  Chefs had worked 
with ingredients that were not identical to the massed produced ingredients used in the 
manufacturing process and so it became a major problem to reproduce what the chef did in their 
kitchen.  The solution was to develop ‘chef packs’ of the bulk ingredients, so that when chefs 
invented new meals using these ingredients – and they do this by tasting and experiment – the meals 
were immediately mass producible.  Similar types of solutions are to be found in the way the 
Apache public domain web site developer is developed by users and then incorporated into 
advanced versions of the software and in the way the Unix operating system Linux is developed. 
Iansiti and Levien (2004) describe the way firms play different roles in the business 
ecosystems involved in developing computer hardware and software systems.  One type of role is 
that of ‘keystones’ who are richly connected hubs providing the foundation for creating niches and 
increase diversity and productivity in their business ecosystems.  TSMC is a keystone in the 
integrated circuit ecosystem and NIVDIA is a successful niche player.  NVIDIA outsources all 
fabrication of its graphics processing units to TSMC, thereby leveraging the expertise of these 
suppliers.  TSMC is based in Taiwan but enables its clients, like NVIDIA, to maintain close contact 
with the production system for its chips, to the extent that the client can make late engineering 
changes and even cancel orders at the last minute without a large penalty.  TSMC uses the Internet 
to make information on designs and products available from its technology library all the time so 
that the customer can access what they need without human intervention.  They do not do any 
designs themselves or compete with their customers in design; its systems are set up to let its 
leading edge customers lead.  It would be impossible and impractical for the enabler to try to fully 
understand its customers’ requirements and offer them potential solutions.  Instead, it provides them 
with the necessary tools and means for others to use it effectively in solving their problems as they 
arise.   
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In these examples firms attempt to develop relationships with customers and other firms that 
are generative, in which they can play both leadership and followship roles; allowing themselves to 
be planned by others as well as to plan for others, to change their interpretations of their 
environment and to harness their resources in ways they could not anticipate.  It is impossible to 
capture the customer’s or other organisation’s understanding or ‘mind’ even with sophisticated 
marketing research and modelling methods, and to transfer this understanding to the ‘mind’ of the 
supplier.   
Learning to soft assemble strategies limits the need for managers to explicitly try to take into 
account all the direct and indirect relationship and network effects of their resources and actions.  
This is impossible and it is likely to be counterproductive even if it were possible because it would 
make resources and networks even more richly interconnected and more unpredictable and chaotic.  
For this reason Kauffman (1994) has suggested that evolution has tended to produce organisms that 
are optimally myopic strategists:  ‘not because of costs of computation, but because, if we are 
individually too clever, we tend to transform the world in which we are adapting into a yet-more-
chaotic world in which we fare less well.’  (p 84) 
For firms, soft assembled strategies involve two basic components: (a) positioning and 
repositioning a firm in networks of relations (Johanson and Mattsson 1992) and (b) exploiting and 
exploring relationship and network opportunities, threats and action potentials (March 1991). The 
former focuses on the way a firm couples itself to other firms and organisations both directly and 
indirectly and thereby extends the mind and resources of the network i.e. the sensing, thinking and 
action potentials of the network, or variety in Ashby’s (1952) sense.  Positioning involves micro 
positioning in individual relations and macro positioning in networks of relations.  The coupling 
process is not under the direct control of the firm because it involves a double choice, choosing and 
being chosen by others, and acting and responding.  In addition it is as much about enabling others 
in the network as the focal firm, because we cannot know in advance where new opportunities and 
threats will arise, who can and will recognise them and how to respond.  There is no ideal network 
of relations.  At any time a firm is involved in a portfolio of many types of relations with varying 
functions and connections to other relations, mixtures of cooperation and competition and different 
strengths, which have evolved over time through the actions and interactions of those involved.  
Both strong and weak ties are important.  Weak ties, because they are associated with structural 
holes (Burt 1992), are potential sources of new types of information and play a key role in the 
discovery of new opportunities (Kirzner 1997). Strong ties are important because they are the 
means by which opportunities or threats can discover a firm (Yanto et al 2005) as well other 
functions already discussed.  Strong cooperative ties are the means by which information about 
such opportunities and threats are passed on to others or shared and collaborative action and 
response is orchestrated.  Exploitation and exploration strategies involve trading off the gains to be 
made from working within existing relations and networks versus looking for and developing new 
potential relations and networks.  Existing relations and networks both enable and constrain what 
can be sensed, understood and responded to by the network and these develop and evolve over time 
through the actions, interactions and outcomes taking place.  The way a network responds to 
particular challenge depends not only on the nature of the challenge but on its history and pattern of 
relations, as these set the stage, the starting conditions, for encountering and exploring the future.  
From a society’s perspective a variety of networks is needed in order to ensure that it is not locked 
into only one way of seeing and responding to the future.  The individual firm and its people have 
to be sufficiently flexible to continually re-sculpture their network role and position to remain 
viable players in viable networks and, in so doing, contribute to the evolvability of the networks in 
which they participate. 
 
Conclusions and Research Implications 
We have shown how relationship marketing and network strategies play different roles according to 
the type of environment in which they operate and that this leads to different types of normative 
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theories for management in terms of how to identify, produce and sustain productive interfirm 
relations and networks.  To date, most attention in relationship marketing has been focused on its 
role in Types 1, 2 and 3, in which the firm is the primary strategic actor and relations with 
customers and other organisations can be valuable means by which firms create and sustain 
competitive advantage.  But the types of business problems facing firms in type 4 environments are 
beyond the capacity of individual managers and firms to sense, understand and respond to.   
The increasing number, degree and speed of interconnectivity among people and 
organisations has produced environments that are complex and turbulent, in which firms face strong 
forms of uncertainty. The future is unknown and unknowable because it is produced by complex 
patterns of interactions over time that make it highly non-linear and beyond analytic solution.  To 
survive and adapt to such an environment requires a firm to effectively participate in, help co-create 
and sustain networks of relations in which no firm has control.  This requires a change in 
management ideals, values and strategies.  The forces that have produced this richly inter-connected 
world provide some of the means for people and firms to renegotiate their boundaries and bring the 
manager, firm and network closer together.  This includes developments in information and 
communication technologies that enrich network, relationship and interrelating possibilities.  Such 
developments not only extend and enhance existing firm resources and functionalities, they create 
new types of complementary functionalities, as managers learn to exploit different kinds of 
feedback loops and action potentials that come from being coupled to other firms and organisations 
in new ways.  The network extends more than the body of the participant firms, i.e. their resources 
and action potential, it extends their mind and senses so that, through interactions with others, firms 
are able to recognise, comprehend and respond to opportunities and threats they otherwise could 
not.  
In addition, there are signs that changes in business values and ideals are taking place, as 
firms are becoming more aware of and sensitive to the wider impacts of their actions and are 
increasingly exploring the role of more collaborative strategies, by bringing suppliers, customers 
and other organisations earlier into strategy planning and development processes.  But including 
other firms thinking in your own planning and strategy development is only part of the problem.  
They also need to be included in the planning and strategy development processes of relevant 
others.  To achieve this requires an ability to adapt both goals and means (not just the means for 
achieving fixed goals) in response to others, to be an effective follower as well as leader and to be 
prepared to be ‘planned’ by others as well as to plan for others.  
Strategy becomes more about searching via interaction processes to discover and respond to 
opportunities and threats, rather than about designing and controlling resources to achieve desired 
outcomes. Network positioning and repositioning become key strategic issues as firms seeks to 
identify and engage in generative relations through which they sense, interpret and reinterpret their 
world and act and respond to it (Gadde, Huemer and Hakansson 2003; Hakansson, Harrison and 
Waluszewski 2004).  The relevant networks and relations here are not confined to a particular 
industry, place, or nation, though these may be important, instead they may span industries, 
technologies and nations (Wilkinson, Mattsson and Easton 2000).   
Methods developed for guiding and solving management problems in other types of 
environments are of limited value in dealing with Type 4 problems.  Marketing engineering 
approaches may be able to solve part of the problem but, in turbulent environments, such 
optimisation problems are embedded in more complex problems that have no optimal solution and 
that relate to the broader environmental and strategic context in which the firm operates and in 
which the strategy will be understood and implemented (e.g. Lilien et al 2004).  Local optima may 
be poor solutions for both the individual and their relationships in the wider context and may serve 
to limit a firms understanding and ability to respond.  
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Research Implications and Agent Based Models 
The focus of this paper has been on the strategic problems confronting firms in different types of 
environments, particularly turbulent environments.  In order for us to improve our understanding of 
this type of environment, to sensitise managers to the complexities involved and to give them better 
advice about identifying and responding to such environments further research is needed.  There is a 
fast growing area of complexity science that focuses on the role and impact of interactions in 
shaping the dynamics and evolution of complex adaptive systems, such as type 4 environments. 
This offers both theories and methods to advance our understanding and responses to such 
environment in marketing contexts.  While there are signs of a growing interest this area in 
marketing is still underdeveloped compared to other disciplines (e.g. Holbrook 2003).  Here we 
offer some suggestions as to how marketing can make better use of its theories and methods.  
The prime method employed in complexity research is agent based simulation models to 
create artificial worlds mimicking key features of a focal system (e.g. Langton 1996; Casti 1997). 
Such models are not based on a set of general driving equations, as was the case in previous types 
of simulations  (e.g. Forrester 1966), but allow for a heterogeneous interacting set of agents, which 
could represent firms, individuals or other objects, with their own goals, resources and rules of 
behaviour that may change as a result of learning.  Relations and networks are created through 
ongoing interactions.  No equilibrium outcomes are assumed, instead the system gravitates towards 
different types ‘attractors’ depending on various model parameters.  
Studies of actual business systems reveal only one history, what types of relations and 
networks have been successful and how they developed.  But this does not tell us whether this is 
one of a number of possible histories and types of outcomes or not.  Management needs to know 
which factors influence the likelihood of different types of outcomes emerging and the role and 
impact management interventions can have.  Such an analysis is impossible when we only have one 
or a few detailed histories to use; we cannot go back and run history again to see how sensitive it is 
to different factors.  But agent based simulation models enable us to capture important features of 
the evolutionary process and conduct experiments to see identify alternative types of outcomes, 
tipping points, and how sensitive and stable they are to different conditions and disturbances 
including various types of management interventions.  
McKelvey (2004) sees agent based models as offering a middle ground between thick and 
thin descriptions that is capable of bridging the two. Thick descriptions result from in depth case 
studies of actual business histories, which reveal some of the complex causal processes involved but 
which cannot be easily generalised.  Thin descriptions result from sample survey type research 
which is more generalizable but which abstracts away from any examination of the processes, 
events or choices by which different types of variables are interrelated and affect outcomes (Abbott 
1992).  
‘[R]esearchers (1) could begin with agent models that generate multifinality samples, 
(2) find abstracted solutions cutting across the multifinality variances, and then 3) model 
these abstracted, potentially equifinality solutions under different environmental conditions 
to test how much generality they have and more specifically, identify conditions where they 
do or do not hold true.’ (McKelvey, 2004, p. 333)  
This is the challenge for marketing theory and research if we are to make headway in 
developing normative marketing theory for managers in complex adaptive systems.  Agent -based 
models offer the opportunity to develop and test our normative theories, sensitize managers to the 
perplexing behaviour of non-linear complex systems and to advance our theories of the dynamics 
and evolution of marketing systems and practices.  
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